Bruce is better off not working, irrespective of the actions of the other members.

The dominant strategy equilibrium of this public goods game is when no one works.

Bruce’s net income when all three members work is £80.

The socially optimal outcome (one with the highest total net income) is when all work.

An allocation can be neither Pareto efficient nor dominated.

An allocation is Pareto efficient if it is impossible to make any individual better off without making someone else worse off.

An allocation can be both Pareto efficient and dominated at the same time.

Pareto efficiency is achieved if the benefit of allocation is higher than the cost of allocation.

Taxes and benefits.

“Buy-now-pay-later” deals.

Theft of property.

Birthday presents.

If there is a reduction of more than 25 million dollars in the cost for the country to take measures to reduce emissions due to technological advancements, the US and China will reach the outcome that is best for both.

If the benefit from reducing emissions increases by more than 20 million dollars for both countries as long as at least one country chooses to restrict, (restrict, restrict) is a Nash equilibrium.

The Nash equilibrium results in the highest possible payoffs for both players.

If China chooses BAU, US will also choose BAU.