rectification.

repudiation.

adiation.

substitution.

The RCLSA introduces the concept of freedom of testation into the customary law of succession.

In terms of the RCLSA a spouse of a deceased in a substitute marriage is considered as a descendant of the deceased.

The RCLSA recognises the application of the Intestate Succession Act to woman-to-woman marriages in terms of customary law.

The RCLSA excludes the working of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 in the case of a deceased married in terms of customary law.

The presumption in favour of a fideicommissary substitution and against direct substitution if there is reasonable doubt.

The presumption that, when there is a conflict between the printed part and the handwritten or typed part of a standard form will, the written or typed part of the will reflects the true intention of the testator.

The presumption that the testator intended vesting of an inheritance to occur on his or her death.

The presumption that a testator did not wish to disinherit his or her children or descendants but intended to benefit them equally.

For Daisy both dies cedit and dies venit will take place at the testator’s death; for Sarah dies cedit will take place at the testator’s death and dies venit when Daisy emigrates.

For both Daisy and Sarah dies cedit and dies venit will both take place at the testator’s death.

For Daisy dies cedit will take place at the testator’s death and dies venit when she emigrates; for Sarah both dies cedit and dies venit will take place when Daisy emigrates.

For Daisy both dies cedit and dies venit will take place at the testator’s death; for Sarah both dies cedit and dies venit will take place when Daisy emigrates.

Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd 2006 (4) SA 205 (C)

Braun v Blann and Botha 1984 (2) SA 850 (A)

Curators, Emma Smith Educational Fund v University of Kwazulu-Natal 2010 (6) SA 518 (SCA)

Estate Kemp v MacDonalds Trustee 1915 AD 491

a testator

voluntarily alienates the object of a legacy during his or her lifetime causing

the legacy to fail.

It gives rise to a presumption that the

testator impliedly appointed the children mentioned in the clause as

fideicommissary beneficiaries, provided they are the descendants of the

testator.

It has no legal effect.

It does not give rise to any presumption and

the intention of the testator must be determined.

It always gives rise to a presumption that the

testator impliedly appointed the children mentioned in the clause as

fideicommissary beneficiaries.

The Court held that the will was validly executed according to the formalities that was in place before 1992, but the Court pointed out that if a similar case were to be decided about a will executed after 1992, such a will would be invalid due to the amendments made to the Wills Act in 1992.

The Court held that this will was invalid, since the witnesses did not sign at the end of the will as required by the Wills Act 7 of 1953.

The Court held that this will was valid, since the Wills Act 7 of 1953 does not require the witnesses to sign at the end of the will.

The Court held that the will was not validly executed according to the formalities that was in place before 1992, but the Court pointed out that if a similar case were to be decided about a will executed after 1992, such a will would be valid due to the amendments made to the Wills Act in 1992.

Mary, Nina and Ben will inherit the house since they are Tom’s intestate heirs.

Wendy will inherit the house since that was what Tom provided in his will.

Susan will inherit the house since she inherited the house from Wendy.

Mary and Nina will inherit the house since they are Tom’s testate heirs.